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ARTICLES
ALCATEL USA, INC. V. BROWN: DOES
YOUR BOSS OWN YOUR BRAIN?
JIM C. LAIt

I.

INTRODUCTION

Who owns your thoughts? According to the 219th Judicial District
Court of the State of Texas, your employer might.' On July 26, 2002, in
Alcatel USA, Inc. v. Brown, 2 the court ruled that a company owned
rights to a software idea that existed entirely in the thoughts of its former employee, Evan Brown. 3 The court held that Alcatel was entitled to
summary judgment on its claims alleging that Brown breached an invention disclosure contract 4 that contained no exceptions 5 and issued a declaratory judgment holding the contract enforceable. Furthermore, the
court granted Alcatel "full legal right, title, and interest" to Brown's "Solution,"6 a process for "converting machine-executable binary code into
7
high-level source code."
In granting summary judgment to Alcatel, the court decided that the
contract was enforceable, that Brown had breached the agreement, and
t James C. Lai is a LL.M. candidate in the John Marshall Law School's Information
Technology and Privacy Law program. James attended law school at the University of
South Carolina and is an attorney-editor for Lexis-Nexis. E-mail: james.lai@lexisnexis.
com.

1. Alcatel USA, Inc. v. Brown, No. 199-00596-97 (Tex. Dist. Ct. 219th Dist. July 26,
2002).
2. Id.
3. Erica Lehrer Goldman, Idea in Former Employee's Head Belongs to Alcatel 1 1
<http://www.law.com> (last updated Aug. 12, 2002).
4. An invention disclosure agreement is a contract that many companies require their
employees to sign. By signing such a contract, an employee essentially assigns to the company the ownership rights of any invention that he or she develops while working for the
employer. They may also require employees to disclose to the company any inventions they
may develop.
5. Goldman, supra n. 3, at 2.
6. Id. at 7.
7. Id.
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that Alcatel owned the Solution. Brown has appealed the case, but the
court's decision, if upheld on appeal, will have serious consequences for
the technology industry. By signing their employees to ironclad invention disclosure agreements, employers will be able to follow Alcatel's example and claim rights to "inventions" created by their employees
through breach of contract litigation.8
By recognizing Alcatel's claim of ownership to Brown's Solution, the
court created a way for employers with clever counsel to circumvent the
protections that courts have applied to covenants not to compete, 9 which
hold unenforceable any agreements that unreasonably burden employees who sign them. 10 By recognizing Alcatel's claims of ownership to
Brown's Solution, the court has allowed companies to sue former employees who bring their skills to new jobs and claim that whatever intellectual property the employees are currently developing at their new jobs
should have been disclosed under an invention disclosure agreement
prior to the employee's departure from the company by alleging that the
employees breached invention disclosure agreements signed while they
were still on the job.
A company's ability to exploit intellectual property rights, either
through exclusive control over an innovation or through profits from licensing agreements, is critical to the economy of the twenty-first century. The owners of intellectual property can control the ability of others
to make use of their property. Companies develop intellectual property
by hiring people to develop it for them.1 1 Companies rely on invention
disclosure agreements like the one Brown signed to acquire valuable intellectual property rights that would otherwise belong to the individuals
who invented them.1 2 These agreements are important to any technology-oriented company because they provide the means for companies to
benefit from the work they pay their employees to do. 13 However, in this
case, the company, and the court, went too far. By recognizing an employer's ownership of intellectual property that does not exist as defined
by the law of copyright, patent, trademark, and trade secret, 14 the
8. Alcatel USA, Inc. v. Brown, No. 199-00596-97 (Tex. Dist. Ct. 219th Dist. July 26,
2002).
9. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 188 (1981). Courts restrictively interpret covenants not to compete that are overly burdensome to the employee signing them by allowing
only "reasonable" restrictions on the former employee's right to compete.
10. Id.
11. Goldman, supra n. 3, at § Seeking Bright Lines.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 12.
14. Intellectual property is divided up into patent, copyright, trademark, and trade
secret protection. In order to qualify for one of the four forms of intellectual property protection, the property in question must meet certain requirements. The Copyright Act requires the fixation of an original work of authorship in a tangible medium. General
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court's decision provides companies with a way to restrain the intellectual property market with all-encompassing invention disclosure agreements. This Casenote looks at the ramifications of the court's decision in
the context of the technology Alcatel has wrested from Evan Brown's possession, an idea for a computer program that, if it works, can easily convert software written for obsolete systems to forms usable by modern
computers.
This Casenote consists of five sections. Part I provides factual background consisting of: (1) an overview of Evan Brown's employment history, the work he did during his employment with DSC, and the
problems that led him to begin developing his Solution in the first place,
(2) a brief discussion of Brown's technology, and (3) the history of the
litigation surrounding Brown and the technology he developed. Beginning with Brown's first attempt to negotiate a release with DSC in order
to avoid a lawsuit, DSC's termination of negotiations and filing of a lawsuit, the injunctions granted in favor of DSC against Brown, and the final disposition of the case on DSC's motion for summary judgment.
Part II discusses the core issues decided in the case: whether invention disclosure agreements are enforceable, whether they cover ideas
that, like Brown's Solution, have not been reduced to any tangible form,
and whether an employer can claim ownership in such an idea. It looks
at each issue in the context of intellectual property in today's high-tech
economy and how the resolution of each issue will impact the future.
Part III traces the history of the litigation. By reference to the arguments made and the orders issued, this section details the court's decision on each issue and its reasoning behind each of its decisions. Part V
evaluates the court's holdings and explores the inadequacy of the court's
decision. It explores in greater detail the ramifications of the court's decision and its potential impact on the high-tech industry well beyond the
boundaries of a single state. It also discusses the policy implications behind the enforcement of invention disclosure agreements as the trial
Information About Copyrights, How Do I Copyright My Software % 2 <http://
www.patents.com/copyrigh.htm> (last updated Sep. 20, 1998). The Lanham Act provides
trademark protection to names and phrases that identify the owner's product. General
Information about Trademarks <http://www.patents.comltrademar.htm> (last updated
June 30, 1995). Patent protection is extended to inventions that have been disclosed to the
U.S. Patent & Trademark Office and which meet the requirements of nonobviousness, novelty, and usefulness. General Information About Patents <httpJ/www.patents.compatents.htm> (accessed April 3, 2003). Trade secret protection is extended to information that
provides economic advantage to its owner because it is not known to the public. Uniform
Trade Secrets Act § 1(4) (1985). The one element common to all forms of intellectual property protection is that they all require something tangible. Copyright law does not protect
ideas. Patent law requires enabling descriptions of the invention or description. Trademark law requires use in commerce or intent to do so soon. Trade secret law requires the
existence of a secret.
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court did and the need to apply principles similar to those governing covenants not to compete 15 to the enforcement of such agreements. The
Conclusion summarizes the impact of the trial court's decision and the
negative effects it can have on the high-tech economy. Finally, it states
succinctly why the case was wrongly decided and what the court should
have done differently.
II. BACKGROUND

A. EvAN BROwN's EMPLOYMENT HISTORY
Brown first began translating computer programs from one hardware platform to another when he was an undergraduate student at
Texas A&M, between 1970 and 1978.16 His work required him to translate programs written in one computer language into another computer
language so that they could run on different computer systems. Brown
wrote conversion utilities to help him handle common problems, but fin17
ished the jobs by hand.
In 1976, Brown conceived the idea for a computer program that
would automatically convert programs written in obsolete computer languages into modern computer languages that newer computers could
read and execute.' 8 From then until DSC hired him in 1987, Brown
worked for several employers and wrote a number of computer programs
designed to convert programs written for one type of computer into a
form that other computers could run. 1 9
DSC hired Brown in 1987.20 While working for DSC, 2 1 Brown perfected his idea for a program that would convert "executable binary code
into high-level source code." 2 2 This process, if successful, would allow
computers to automatically reverse-engineer existing programs and pro15. Id.
16. Id.
17. AfT. Evan Brown
3 (Dec. 1, 1998).
18. Id. at 4.
19. Id at T 4-9.
20. Id. at 1 9.
21. By affidavit, Brown stated that DSC hired him 'as an assembly-language programmer to develop and maintain software" for the company's computer systems. AfT Brown
9 (Dec. 1, 1998). At oral argument over the company's motion for summary judgment,
counsel for the company presented evidence that during Brown's employment, DSC had
investigated conversion technology on two occasions. S.J. Hrg. Tr. 27:7-20 (Dec. 21, 2001).
On the other hand, Brown stated in his affidavit that "[alt no time during [his] employment
with DSC was [he] assigned the job or task of developing a computer program to convert
machine executable code to high-level source [code]." Aff. Brown 91 10 (Dec. 1, 1998).
Brown also stated that prior to his employment with DSC, he had spent years doing platform translations before working for DSC and that he wrote utilities to partially automate
the process. Id.
22. Goldman, supra n. 3, at 7.
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duce source code that can easily be adapted for use on new computer
systems. 23 Shortly after it hired him, DSC required Brown to sign an
invention disclosure agreement 2 4 in which he promised to communicate
to the company any inventions that he developed during the course of his
25
employment with DSC.

B.

THE SOLUTION

The innovation at issue was Brown's idea for a program that would
automatically reverse engineer computer software and translate it into
source code. The term "reverse engineering" describes a process by
which a subject is analyzed in order to: (1) identify its components and
the relationships among them, and (2) create a representation of the subject at a higher level of abstraction. 26 Computer programs are most
often written in a "high-level" programming language, which human programmers can easily understand and work with. In order to make them
28
work, the resulting "source code" 27 is converted into "machine code,"
which provides instructions that computers can execute, but which few
humans can understand or work with effectively. The programs that
29
conduct such conversions are called compilers.
Brown's Solution was a method for creating a decompiler. A decompiler is, in theory, a computer program that would read machine-code
23. Id.

24. Employee Pat. Agreement of Evan Brown (Apr. 27, 1987).
25. The agreement Brown signed states that:
In consideration of.. .continued employment... with DSC Communications Corporation, and of the salary or wages paid for... such employment, [Brown would]: (A)
communicate to an officer of the company promptly and fully all inventions (including but not limited to all matters subject to patent) [that he] made or conceived.., from the time of entering the Company's employ until [his departure] (1)
which are along the lines of the business, work or investigations of the Company.. .or (2) which result from or are suggested by any work which [Brown might
do] for or on behalf of the Company.
Id. Brown stated that the scope of his employment did not include the development of
reverse-engineering utilities because (1) DSC was not in the business of producing such
products, and (2) Brown did not develop such programs as part of his job. DSC, however,
claimed that it had conducted several experiments in decompilation. S.J. Hrg. Tr. 26:2127:20.
26. Arie Van Deursen, Reverse Engineering911 <http://www.program-transformation.
org/twikilbinlview/Transform/ReverseEngineering> (accessed Apr. 03, 2003).
27. Eelco Visser, Program Compilation 911 <http:/Iwww.program-transformation.org/
twikilbinlview/Transform/ProgramCompilation> (last updated Dec. 02, 2001).
28. Id.

29. Id. The compilation process is usually composed of several steps during which the
source code is first translated into an intermediate "language" that is more difficult for
humans to understand than source code but easier for computers to interpret. Id. A code
program called a code generator translates this intermediate code into machine-readable
object code. Eelco Visser, Code Generation 1 1 <http://www.program-transformation.org/
twiki/binlview/Transform/CodeGeneration> (last updated Sep. 29, 2002).
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and convert it into source code. 30 Decompilation techniques have been in
use since the 1960s allowing programs written for one computer system
31
Comto be recompiled into machine code written for other systems.
mon wisdom in the industry dictates that fully automated decompilation
is impossible. Most successful decompilers rely on external information,
such as the type of compiler originally used to generate the machine
32
code, or require human input at various stages of the process.
C.

THE CASE

The Solution, if workable, could revolutionize the process of program
transformation and allow users to upgrade their computer systems without having to worry about software compatibility. 33 Brown and DSC
both realized the value of such a program. 34 In 1996, Brown asked DSC
to release him from his invention disclosure agreement in order to pursue development of his idea free from any threat of interference from the
company. 35 Although the parties negotiated for a year, DSC ultimately
fired Brown and brought a breach of contract action against him. The
company claimed that Brown violated the agreement when he failed to
disclose the idea and sought a declaratory judgment giving it ownership
rights in the idea. 36 During the course of litigation, DSC sought and obtained an injunction that prevented Brown from: (1) disclosing or selling
the Solution to anyone other than DSC, (2) further developing the Solution except according to the terms of a mandatory injunction, and (3) destroying any material or records relating to the Solution. 3 7 The court
also issued a mandatory injunction that required Brown to preserve the
38
Solution and to disclose it to DSC in a manner outlined in its order.
Despite the fact that the "invention" in which DSC claimed ownership
rights existed solely within Brown's thoughts, the court ultimately forced
Brown to disclose the Solution to DSC and awarded the company's suc30. Arie Van Deursen, Decompilation <http://www.program-transformation.org/twiki/
bin/view/Transform/DeCompilation> (last updated Feb. 27, 2002).
31. Id.
32. Mike Van Emmerik, Is DecompilationPossible?<http://www.program-transformation.org/twiki/bin/view/Transform/DeCompilationPossible> (last updated Apr. 29, 2002).
Fully automated decompilation is commonly considered impossible because of the nature of
the compilation process. Id. No two compilers act exactly the same way, so designing a
single tool that can successfully reverse engineer the object code generated by any compiler
is, in theory, impossible. Id.
33. Goldman, supra n. 3.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1 10.
36. Id. at 8.
37. Alcatel USA, Inc. u. Brown, No. 199-000596-97, (Tex. Dist. Ct. 219th Dist. Temp.
Inj. Order June 30, 1997).
38. Id.
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cessor, Alcatel USA, full ownership. 39 Finally, on July 26, 2002, the
court granted Alcatel's motion for summary judgment in a short opinion
that stated, without analysis or discussion, that Alcatel was entitled to
40
the relief it sought.
III. ISSUES PRESENTED
The issues presented to the court for discussion were: (1) whether
the invention disclosure agreement was valid and enforceable, (2)
whether Brown had breached the agreement, (3) whether Brown or Alcatel owned the rights to the Solution, and (4) whether Alcatel was entitled to injunctive relief prohibiting Brown from disclosing the Solution to
third parties and requiring Brown to completely disclose the Solution to
Alcatel.
In the court's order granting Alcatel's motion for summary judgment, it held that: (1) Brown had breached the invention disclosure
agreement with DSC, 4 1 (2) the invention disclosure agreement between
Brown and DSC was valid and enforceable, 4 2 (3) pursuant to the agreement, Alcatel, through its acquisition of DSC, owned all rights to the
processes and/or methods Brown had developed for (a) converting machine executable binary code into high level source code, (b) reverse-engineering existing computer programs into high-level program code, and
(c) converting machine-executable programs written for DSC's computer
systems into source code, 4 3 (4) Brown was obligated to fully disclose the
Solution to Alcatel, 44 (5) Brown could not disclose, sell, assign, or transfer the Solution to anyone other than Alcatel, nor could he negotiate any
such transaction with anyone other than Alcatel, 4 5 and (6) Brown could
not further develop or market the Solution to anyone other than
46
Alcatel.
IV.

THE COURT'S ANALYSIS

By granting summary judgment, the court found that no genuine
issues of material fact existed and that Alcatel was entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. 4 7 The court effectively accepted Alcatel's analysis of
39.
40.
2002).
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id.
Alcatel USA, Inc. v. Brown, No. 199-0056-97 (Tex. Dist. Ct. 219th Dist. Jul. 26,
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Tex. R. Civ. P. 166(a)(c).
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the facts and rejected Brown's. 48 First, the court found that the invention disclosure agreement was valid and enforceable. 49 Although Brown
asserted, in a hearing on DSC's motion for a temporary injunction, that
the agreement was unenforceable as unsupported by consideration, 50 the
court rejected the argument. The court accepted DSC's assertion that
the cases Brown had cited were distinguishable. 5 1
Second, the court found that the Solution fell within the scope of the
invention disclosure agreement. DSC presented evidence that Brown
had become aware of DSC's software conversion efforts through internal
memoranda written both to Brown's group and directly to Brown himself,52 and had done conversion work for DSC. 53 The court also found
48. Alcatel USA, Inc. v. Brown, No. 199-0056-97 (Tex. Dist. Ct. 219th Dist. Jul. 26,
2002). During a hearing on DSC's summary judgment motion, counsel for the company
claimed that this was a simple breach of contract case. S.J. Hrg. Tr. 24:20-22. The company argued that Brown signed an invention disclosure agreement one week after he
started work for the company. Id. at 25:6-25. The agreement obliged Brown to communicate his inventions to the company. Id. The company further alleged that Brown's work on
various software tools related to program conversion showed that the Solution was related
to its business and to Brown's employment. Finally, the company claimed that by requesting a release to pursue a patent, Brown acknowledged that the Solution was an invention
covered by the agreement. S.J. Hrg. Tr. 25:6-32:1. Brown argued that the agreement was
unenforceable for lack of consideration, that the Solution did not fall within the scope of the
agreement because it was not related to DSC's business of telecommunications, and that
the Solution was not an invention. Id. at 37:6-46:24.
49. Alcatel USA, Inc. v. Brown, No. 199-0056-97 (Tex. Dist. Ct. 219th Dist. Jul. 26,
2002).
50. Temp. Inj. Hrg. Tr. 56:7-9 (Jun. 30, 1997). Brown asserted that continued employment was an illusory promise that was insufficient consideration to support the enforceability of the invention disclosure agreement. Id.
51. Temp. Inj. Hrg. Tr. 60:19-61:20. Brown cited Light v. Centel Cellular Co., 883
S.W.2d 642, 644 (Tex. 1994), which held, in a former employee's challenge to the enforceability of a covenant not to compete, that consideration for a promise, by either the employee or the employer in an at-will employment, cannot be dependent on a period of
continued employment. Counsel for DSC stated that the Light rule dealt with covenants
not to compete, and was inapplicable to the case. Counsel further stated that Brown's continued employment and the resulting benefits of employment constituted sufficient consideration to support the invention disclosure agreement. Temp. Inj. Hrg. Tr. 60:19-61:20.
52. S.J. Hrg. Tr. 29:14-30:11. Counsel for DSC described two 1993 memoranda that
had been sent to Brown's group at DSC and to Brown himself. Id. One dealt with the
conversion of DSC's existing code into another format. Id. The other described a conversion utility for a different set of software tools. Id.
53. In Brown's self-review in 1989, he stated that he converted several source modules
from assembly language into high-level source code. Id. at 31:2. In 1992, a similar review
listed the development of tools for the conversion of assembly language to source code as a
career goal. Id. at 30:18-31:15. On the other hand, Brown presented evidence that DSC
was focused on providing telecommunications services and that its business did not include
any other fields. Id. at 37:11-19. Brown also attacked the relevance of DSC's prior
software conversion attempts. Brown claimed that those projects involved the conversion
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that the Solution qualified as an invention. In its final order, the court
found that the Solution was
a process and/or method developed by Evan Brown for (1) converting
machine executable binary code into a high-level source code using logic
and data abstractions, (2) taking existing computer programs and reverse-engineering the intelligence from those programs and re-coding
converting exthe intelligence into portable high-level language, and (3)
54
ecutable Z8000 machine code into C language source.
Counsel for DSC argued that Brown had breached a provision of the
agreement that required him to disclose to the company any inventions
he had developed along the lines of the business of the company and to
55
disclose any inventions resulting from his work for DSC.
Third, the court found that Brown had breached the agreement by
failing to disclose the Solution to DSC. 5 6 In support of its motion for
summary judgment, DSC claimed that Brown had two duties under the
invention disclosure agreement: (1) to disclose inventions along the lines
of the business, work, or investigations of the company, and (2) to dis57
close inventions resulting from or suggested by his work for DSC.
Counsel for DSC stated that the company had been engaged in investigations of conversion technology similar to Brown's Solution. In order to
show that the Solution was an invention along the lines of the business,
work, or investigations of DSC, or resulting from or suggested by
Brown's work for the company, counsel pointed to efforts by DSC in 1993
and 1995 to develop software conversion tools. 58 During the temporary
injunction hearing, a witness for DSC testified that the company was in
the business of software development and that it spent a significant perof code from one language to merely another version of the same language, S.J. Hrg. Tr.
38:2-7, and manual software conversion, S.J. Hrg. Tr. 38:8-11.
54. Alcatel USA, Inc. v. Brown, No. 199-0056-97 (Tex. Dist. Ct. 219th Dist. Jul. 26,
2002).
55. S.J. Hrg. Tr. 25:15-20. During a hearing on DSC's motion for a temporary injunction mandating full disclosure of the Solution, which Brown had allegedly fully worked out,
counsel for DSC argued that the fact that the Solution existed solely in Brown's mind and
had not been written down or otherwise implemented was irrelevant to its status as an
invention covered by the disclosure agreement. Temp. Inj. Hrg. Tr. 51:8-51:24. The court
accepted that argument when it ordered Brown to disclose the Solution to DSC in its entirety (Temp. Inj. Order 3) and when it found Brown in breach of the agreement on summary judgment. Alcatel USA, Inc. v. Brown, No. 199-0056-97 (Tex. Dist. Ct. 219th Dist.
Aug. 26, 2002). Despite the fact that even after Brown completed the disclosure, the Solution as described was "woefully incomplete and inadequate by steps." S.J. Hrg. Tr. 24:1617.
56. Alcatel USA, Inc. v. Brown, No. 199-0056-97 (Tex. Dist. Ct. 219th Dist. Aug. 26,
2002).
57. S.J. Hrg. Tr. 25:15-20.
58. Id. at 27:1-17.
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centage of its research budget on such development. 59 On motion for
summary judgment, DSC argued that the evidence had established that
the development of software conversion tools such as the Solution was
therefore within the scope of the invention disclosure agreement. 60
In a six-page opinion, that did not include a discussion of the facts of
the case or cite any law that the court used in reaching its conclusion, the
court determined as a matter of law that: (1) the invention disclosure
agreement was enforceable, (2) the Solution was an invention covered by
the agreement, and (3) Brown had breached the agreement by failing to
disclose the Solution to DSC. 6 1 As a result, the court necessarily found
that Alcatel, as DSC's successor in interest, was entitled to a declaration
of its ownership rights in the Solution and to a permanent injunction
preventing Brown from interfering with those rights.
V.

THE AUTHOR'S ANALYSIS

In this case, the court erred when it found that no genuine issues of
material fact existed as to: (1) the enforceability of agreement, (2) the
applicability of the agreement to Brown's Solution, and (3) Brown's
breach of the agreement by his failure to disclose the Solution to DSC. In
Texas,
a party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or
to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the adverse
party has appeared or answered, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof.
A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on
the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to
62
amount of damages.
Upon motion for summary judgment,
the judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if (i) the deposition
transcripts, interrogatory answers, and other discovery responses referenced or set forth in the motion or response, and (ii) the pleadings, admissions, affidavits, stipulations of the parties, and authenticated or
59. Temp. Inj. Hrg. Tr. 42:21-43:7.
60. DSC claimed that: (1) Brown's signature on the invention disclosure agreement, (2)
evidence of DSC's other investigations into software conversion, (3) Brown's knowledge of
and occasional participation in those investigations, (4) Brown's statements in his self-evaluations regarding software-conversion tools, and (5) Brown's attempts to obtain a release
from the invention disclosure agreement established as a matter of law that the Solution
was an invention covered by the disclosure agreement and that Brown had breached the
contract by failing to disclose it. DSC also claimed that the agreement was enforceable
because Brown's continued employment with the company until his discharge in 1997 constituted consideration for the agreement. S.J. Hrg. Tr. 29:3-9.
61. Alcatel USA, Inc. v. Brown, No. 199-0056-97 (Tex. Dist. Ct. 219th Dist. Aug. 26,
2002).
62. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166 a(a).
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certified public records, if any, on file at the time of the hearing, or filed
thereafter and before judgment with permission of the court, show that,
except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law on the issues expressly set out in the motion or in an answer or
any other response. Issues not expressly presented to the trial court by
written motion, answer or other response shall not be considered on appeal as grounds for reversal. A summary judgment may be based on
uncontroverted testimonial evidence of an interested witness, or of an
expert witness as to subject matter concerning which the trier of fact
must be guided solely by the opinion testimony of experts, if the evidence is clear, positive and direct, otherwise credible and free from contradictions and inconsistencies, and could have been readily
63
controverted.
Based on this standard and the facts presented during the course of
the litigation, it is clear that the court erroneously granted DSC's summary judgment motion.

A.

THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT FOUND THE AGREEMENT ENFORCEABLE
AS A MATTER OF LAW

The court erred when it found no genuine issues of material fact surrounding the enforceability of the invention disclosure agreement itself.
According to the Supreme Court of Texas,
at-will employees may contract with their employers on any matter except those which would limit the ability of either employer or employee
to terminate the employment at will. Consideration for a promise, by
either the employee or the employer in an at-will employment, cannot
64
be dependent on a period of continued employment.
Therefore, the agreement was unenforceable for lack of consideration 65 if the sole consideration that DSC offered Brown was its forbear66
ance from terminating his employment.
The Supreme Court of Texas has also found that a unilateral contract can exist if a company makes a promise in return for continued atwill employment and the company both continues to employ the at-will
employee and provides benefits such as specialized training. However,
63. Id. at 166 a(c).
64. Light, 883 S.W.2d at 644.
65. Brown testified by affidavit that one week after he began working for DSC, the
company told him to sign the invention disclosure agreement at issue in this case or face
immediate termination. Aff. Evan Brown 3 (Sep. 29, 1997).
66. Counsel for Alcatel argued that DSC provided consideration to Brown in the nature of employment benefits and training. Brown, on the other hand, claimed that such
benefits were part of any employee's compensation package and argued that the invention
disclosure agreement was an additional obligation that required additional consideration.
Temp. Inj. Hrg. Tr. 59:9-18.
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the court said that such a contract would only exist if: (1) the performance was bargained-for and not for past consideration, and (2) the employee's acceptance was by performance and not by a promise to
67
perform.
It is clear that genuine issues of material fact exist as to the enforceability of the invention disclosure agreement. If the sole consideration
was Brown's continued at-will employment, then the contract was
clearly unenforceable. However, if DSC provided benefits to Brown in
addition to those normally associated with his employee's compensation
package, then a unilateral contract could exist. In this case, counsel for
DSC stated that the consideration for Brown's invention disclosure
agreement consisted of: (1) continued employment, (2) knowledge of
DSC's trade secrets, (3) training, (4) pay, (5) benefits, and (6) medical
68
insurance.
The facts presented by the two sides raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding the enforceability of the invention disclosure contract.
Because DSC required Brown to sign the invention disclosure agreement
or face immediate discharge, it is clear that the parties did not enter into
an enforceable bilateral contract under the Light rule. 6 9 The only way
for the contract to bind Brown was for a unilateral agreement to exist
where Brown exchanged his promise to disclose his inventions to DSC
and DSC actually provided benefits in addition to those normally associated with employment. The only way for DSC to prove that the agreement was supported by consideration would be to prove that the benefits
supposedly provided by DSC in exchange for his promise were not part of
his normal compensation simply for being a DSC employee and therefore
70
past consideration.
67. Light, 883 S.W.2d at 645.
68. Temp. Inj. Hrg. Tr. 59:9-18.
69. Light, 883 S.W.2d at 644.
70. In Light, the company hired the employee to sell pagers and required her to sign a
covenant not to compete in order to keep her job. Id. at 643. When the company refused to
release the employee from the covenant after she had resigned, the employee sued to have
the agreement declared unenforceable. Id. The agreement provided that:
Salesperson agrees, upon termination of employment with United TeleSpectrum,
and for a period of ONE YEAR thereafter, he/she will not directly or indirectly
compete with United TeleSpectrum in the Longview, Tyler, Marshall service area.
Salesperson agrees that this paragraph prohibits him/her from accepting employment in the Longview, Tyler, Marshall service area from any mobile communications service provider, or any agent or reseller of a mobile communications service
provider, as a salesperson, or in any other capacity that would give the salesperson
customer contact or that would permit the use of the customer related information
he/she acquired in the course of his/her employment with United TeleSpectrum.
Id. In reversing an appellate court decision holding the covenant enforceable, the court
held that because the company failed to offer consideration to the employee beyond its forbearance from terminating her at-will employment, the contract was unenforceable. Id. at
645. The court stated that the only promises arising out of the agreement that could consti-
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B.

THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT FOUND THE SOLUTION WAS
AN INVENTION

Even if the invention disclosure agreement had been enforceable,
the court should have found a genuine issue of material fact surrounding
its applicability to the Solution, because the status of the Solution as an
"invention" remained in doubt. Counsel for DSC claimed that the exis71
tence of the Solution solely within Brown's thoughts was irrelevant.
The court agreed, finding that the Solution was covered by the agreement. 72 However, this argument did not acknowledge the genuine issues of material fact regarding both the status of the Solution as an
invention and, even if the Solution did qualify as an invention, whether
it fell within the scope of the agreement.
The right to exploit an invention or original product is an important
facet of intellectual property protection. 73 Of the four forms of intellectual property-copyrights, patents, trademarks, and trade secrets-the
Solution could potentially qualify for three types of protection: copyright,
patent, and trade secret. 7 4 However, in order for the Solution to receive
tute consideration were the company's promise to provide initial and specialized training in
exchange for the employee's agreement to provide notice to the company upon termination
of employment. Id. at 646. The court held that the company's other promises, such as the
promise to employ at-will, the promise to pay, and the promise to provide employee benefits
were illusory because they depended on the at-will employment relationship. Id. Applying
the Light rule to the instant case, it is clear that the court should have explored the nature
of the consideration, especially since the consideration allegedly provided by DSC corresponds closely to that which the Texas Supreme Court specifically found illusory as dependent on the at-will employment relationship. Temp. Inj. Hrg Tr. 59:9-18.
71. Counsel analogized the Solution to a "confidential or trade secret memorandum or
document." Temp. Inj. Hrg. Tr. 51:8-24. He further stated that because such documents
were subject to the jurisdiction of the court, in the context of trade secret litigation, the
court could properly require Brown to disclose the supposed secret that existed entirely
within his thoughts. Id.
72. In its order granting DSC's motion for summary judgment, the court held that the
Solution was a process and/or method for (a) converting machine executable binary code
into high level source code, (b) reverse-engineering existing computer programs into highlevel program code, and (c) converting machine-executable programs written for DSC's
computer systems into source code. Alcatel USA, Inc. v. Brown, No. 199-0056-97 (Tex. Dist.
Ct. 219th Dist. Aug. 26, 2002).
73. Goldman, supra n. 3, at § Seeking Bright Lines.
74. The Solution would be ineligible for trademark protection because the Lanham Act,
which establishes the scope of federal trademark law, provides trademark protection to
names and phrases that identify the owner's product. Oppedahl and Larson LLP, General
Information about Trademarks <http://www.patents.com/trademar.htm> (last updated
June 30, 1995). Because the Solution is not a name or phrase identifying DSC's product, it
cannot be a trademark. However, the Copyright Act could protect the Solution as an original work of authorship in a tangible medium. Oppedahl and Larson LLP, GeneralInformation About Copyrights: How Do I Copyright My Software? T 2 <http'//www.patents.com/

copyrigh.htm> (last updated Sep. 20, 1998). If the Solution is an invention that has been
disclosed to the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office and which meet the requirements of non-
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intellectual property protection under any of those categories, it would
have to meet certain threshold requirements, as discussed below. Without meeting these, it would be ineligible for intellectual property
protection.
1.

When DSC Fired Brown, the Solution Was Not Eligible for
Copyright Protection

When DSC fired Brown and sued him for breach of contract, the Solution was ineligible for copyright protection. According to the Copyright
Act,
copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now
known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise75communicated, either directly or with the aid of a
machine or device.
A work is "fixed in a tangible medium" 7 6 when it is embodied in a
record, by or under the authority of the creator, sufficiently stable to allow it to be "perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration."7 7 A computer programmer's
thoughts about how to solve a particular problem are clearly not "fixed in
a tangible medium" because there exists no record sufficiently stable to
be communicated. Therefore, the Solution was ineligible for copyright
protection as a matter of law.
2.

A Genuine Issue of Material Fact Exists as to Whether the Solution
Was Eligible for Patent Protection When DSC Fired Brown or
After Court-OrderedDisclosure

Second, even after Brown completed the court-ordered disclosure of
the Solution, it was ineligible for patent protection. The PatentAct provides that "whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefore." 78 The Solution, a
method for the automatic conversion of machine-readable object code to
high-level source code, would clearly qualify as a "new and useful proobviousness, novelty, and usefulness, it could qualify for patent protection. Oppedahl and
Larson LLP, General InformationAbout Patents:What Inventions Can Be Patented?
1-2
<http://www.patents.com/patents.htm> (accessed April 3, 2003). Finally, the Solution
might be entitled to trade secret protection, which is extended to information that provides
economic advantage to its owner because it is not known to the public. Uniform Trade
Secrets Act § 1(4) (1985).
75. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
76. Id.
77. Id. § 101.
78. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
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cess." However, before the Solution could qualify as a patentable inven79
tion, it had to meet certain requirements.
Under 35 U.S.C. § 111(a)(2), an application for a patent must contain the specifications of the invention. Such a specification must
contain
a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of
making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to
enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which
it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set
forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his
80
invention.
When DSC fired Brown and sued him for breach of the invention
disclosure agreement, the Solution could not have qualified as an invention under the requirements for a patent application because no description of the Solution existed at all. Even after the court ordered Brown to
disclose the Solution, as counsel for the company admitted, the Solution
was "woefully incomplete and inadequate by steps,"8 ' suggesting that, at
the very least, a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether it
would enable any person skilled in the art of developing software conversion tools to carry out the Solution.8 2 Although the company claimed
that the state of Brown's disclosure was due to his willful noncompliance
with the court's temporary injunction,8 3 Brown testified by affidavit that
it would take an individual of "extraordinary skill" to reduce the Solution
to a working computer program and that a programmer of ordinary
skill 8 4 would have "virtually no chance" of successfully producing a workable program based without extensive experimentation. 8 5 When DSC
fired Brown, there existed nothing that could even begin to fulfill these
requirements.8 6 The record revealed that even after court-ordered disclosure, the Solution was not, as the court found, a process and/or
method developed by Evan Brown for converting machine-executable binary code into a high-level source code using logic and data abstrac79. An invention is patentable if it has been disclosed to the U.S. Patent & Trademark
Office and meets the requirements of nonobviousness, novelty, and usefulness. General
Information About Patents: What Inventions Can Be Patened?,supra n. 74, at 9 2.
80. 35 U.S.C. § 112.
81. S.J. Hrg. Tr. 24:16-17 (Dec. 21, 2001).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 24:17-19.
84. A patent specification must contain a written description of the invention that can
enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly
connected, to make and use the invention, and shall set fort the best mode contemplated by
the inventor for carrying out his invention. 35 U.S.C. § 112.
85. Af. Brown 1 6 (Sep. 29, 1997). Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 112, in this case, a patent
specification for the Solution would have to enable any person trained in the art of the
development of software conversion tools to reproduce the Solution.
86. Goldman, supra n. 3.
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tions.87 Therefore, the court should have submitted the issue of whether
the Solution could be considered an invention under the PatentAct to the
trier of fact.
3. A Genuine Issue of MaterialFact Would Exist as to the Solution's
Status as a Trade Secret
Third, a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the Solution could be considered a trade secret. In Texas, a trade secret is defined as
any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used
in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it. It may be a formula
for a chemical compound, a process of manufacturing, treating or preserving materials, a pattern for a machine or other device, or a list of
customers. A trade secret is a process or device for continuous use in the
operation of the business. Generally it relates to the production of
goods, as, for example, a machine or formula for the production of an
88
article.
In this case, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the
Solution fell within the definition of a trade secret. Generally, the party
claiming rights in a trade secret has the burden of proving that the information at issue is sufficiently definite to qualify for protection from the
court.8 9 In this case, the facts revealed that despite Brown's disclosure
of the Solution, it was not sufficiently developed. 90 Even counsel for
DSC admitted that the Solution, as disclosed, was incomplete. 91
If the Solution had been a workable blueprint for an automated
decompiler, then it might have been possible to claim trade secret protection. However, when the Solution, as it stood, was incomplete and inadequate for that purpose, the need for further research to develop a
workable implementation of the Solution, DSC could not have used it in
its business to gain an advantage over its competitors or continuously
used the Solution in the operation of its business. At the very least, a
genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the Solution was
92
complete enough to merit trade secret protection.
The Solution is neither an object nor a mechanical process. The Solution is an idea. It is Brown's idea for a way to develop an automated
decompiler to assist in software conversion. An idea that is neither fixed
87.
2002).
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Alcatel USA, Inc. v. Brown, No. 199-0056-97 (Tex. Dist. Ct. 219th Dist. Aug. 26,
Hyde Corp. v. Huffines, 314 S.W.2d 763, 776 (Tex. 1958).
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 39 cmt. c (1995).
Aff. Brown
6 (Sep. 29, 1997); S.J. Hrg. Tr. 24:16-17.
S.J. Hrg. Tr. 24:16-17.
Huffines, 314 S.W.2d 763.
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in a tangible medium 93 nor sufficiently specific to allow a person of reasonable skill to reproduce it for economic gain is not eligible for either
copyright, patent, or trade secret protection. The court's decision stands
for the proposition that ideas are inventions. However, the law of intellectual property as discussed above, clearly states otherwise.
It is possible that DSC intended the invention disclosure agreement
to apply more broadly than the law. However, the agreement and the
record of the case were both silent on that issue. In Jamesbury Corp. v.
Worcester Valve Co.,94 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
held that where state law defined the term "invention" in a manner consistent with federal patent law, an employee had not "invented" something when he conceived of a process, but deliberately chose not to record
it in order to frustrate a similar invention disclosure agreement. 9 5 In
Alcatel, the record is silent on whether Texas law defined the term "invention" in a manner that would support the inclusion of a mere idea
such as the Solution under such a label. The record is also silent on
whether DSC and Brown understood the invention disclosure agreement
96
to apply to untested, unverified ideas.
Finally, the court erred when it held that no genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the development of an automated decompiler was "along the lines" 97 of DSC's business. Both DSC and Brown
presented evidence in support of their respective positions on DSC's business. 98 By disregarding Brown's evidence and accepting DSC's contention that the Solution fell within the scope of DSC's business, the court
accepted DSC's version of the facts, rejected Brown's version, and improperly weighed the evidence on a motion for summary judgment. 99
The court erred by disregarding these flaws in DSC's argument,
granting summary judgment to Alcatel, and refusing to allow a jury to
93. After Brown's court-ordered disclosure of the Solution, it could be considered fixed
in a tangible medium under 17 U.S.C. § 102(a), however under copyright law, the author of
a work owns the copyright in the absence of a legal arrangement to the contrary. 17 U.S.C.
§ 201. If the court's finding regarding DSC's right to the Solution is reversed, then Brown
will own the copyright to the disclosure.
94. Jamesbury Corp. v. Worcester Valve Co., 443 F.2d 205 (1st Cir. 1971).
95. Id. at 212.
96. Brown's invention disclosure agreement covered "all inventions (including but not
limited to all matters subject to patent)." Employee Pat. Agreement of Evan Brown. However, the agreement fails to state what the phrase "not limited to" covers.
97. Employee Pat. Agreement of Evan Brown.
98. S.J. Hrg. Tr. 27:1-17. DSC claimed that its investigations into other software conversion tools demonstrated the Solution's connection to its business. Id. Brown, on the
other hand, pointed to significant differences between those other projects, which mainly
involved manual conversion or conversion of source code from one language to another, and
the Solution. Id. at 37:20-38:16.
99. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166 a(c).
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weigh the evidence to determine whether the agreement was enforceable, whether it applied to the Solution, and whether Brown breached the
agreement. Because the court should not have granted summary judgment on these three issues discussed above, the court also erred in granting declaratory and permanent injunctive relief.
Not only did the court err in granting Alcatel specific performance of
the Invention Disclosure Agreement between Brown and DSC, it also
seems not to have considered the ramifications of its decision. In response to Brown's assertions that a promise supported only by an offer of
continued at-will employment was unenforceable, 10 0 DSC attempted to
distinguish the Light case by arguing that its rationale was limited to
the analysis of covenants not to compete. 1° 1 This assertion is erroneous,
because Texas appellate courts have applied its rule in cases that did not
involve covenants not to compete. Although the Light case articulated
its rule in the context of a covenant not to compete, other Texas cases
applied the rule to hold invalid other types of contracts between employees and employers.
In Tenet Healthcare, Ltd. v. Copper, the Court of Appeals of Texas
applied the Light rule to hold unenforceable a purported arbitration
agreement between the parties. 10 2 Because Texas appellate courts have
applied the Light rule to other types of cases, DSC's attempt to limit the
100. Light, 883 S.W.2d at 644.
101. Temp. Inj. Hrg. Tr. 59:3-8. Counsel for DSC argued that Light and the other cases
cited by Brown were merely premises to the proposition that a covenant not to compete was
a restraint of trade and was not applicable to other types of employment-based contracts.
Id.
102. Tenet Healthcare,Ltd. v. Cooper, 960 S.W.2d 386, 388 (Tex. App. 1st Dist. 1998).
In Tenet, the employee signed a form acknowledging her receipt of an employee handbook
outlining her privileges and obligations as an employee. Id. at 386. Like the Invention
Disclosure Agreement DSC required Brown to sign, the handbook provided that the employee's agreement was a condition of continued employment. Id. The agreement provided
that:
I understand AMI makes available arbitration for resolution of grievances. I also
understand that as a condition of employment and continued employment, I agree
to submit any complaints to the published process and agree to abide by and accept the final decision of the arbitration panel as ultimate resolution of my complaint(s) for any and all events that arise out of employment or termination of
employment. If a state has established an arbitration procedure, AMI and the
employee will comply with the statute requirement.
Id. at 387. Like Brown's Invention disclosure agreement, the purported contract at issue in
this case involved an employee's agreement to an obligation in return for continued employment. Noting that the arbitration clause was to be analyzed under the principles of
contract the court held that ordinary contract principles governed the enforceability of the
agreement. Id. at 388. In holding the arbitration clause unenforceable, the court held that
the agreement was unsupported by consideration, stating that the Texas Supreme Court
has held that consideration for a valid contract between an employer and an at-will employee cannot depend on continued employment because such a promise is illusory and
citing the Light rule. Id.
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applicability of the Light rule to cases involving covenants not to compete was clearly misplaced.
Although it improperly attempted to distinguish Light from the facts
in the present case on the basis that Light involved covenants not to compete, DSC did identify an analogy between such covenants and contracts
like the one at issue. Like a covenant not to compete, an invention disclosure agreement can be considered an agreement in restraint of trade,
particularly given the manner in which the court enforced the agreement
against Brown. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts states that an
agreement is in restraint of trade if its performance would limit competition in any business or restrict the promisor in the exercise of a gainful
10 3
occupation.
The court's enforcement of the invention disclosure agreement definitely restricted Brown's exercise of a gainful occupation. Although
many companies have expressed interest in hiring Brown because of his
technical aptitude, they have refused to offer him a job for fear of a lawsuit from Alcatel. 10 4 These prospective employers have done so with
good reason. 10 5 If a company can sue its employees for breaching an invention disclosure agreement by failing to disclose and turn over something like the Solution that was at best dubiously related to their
employment, it stands to reason that companies could sue its former employees for violation of invention disclosure agreements when they leave
their jobs and bring their knowledge to other employers. The former employers could bring enforcement actions against their former employees,
claiming, as DSC did, 10 6 that the developments they offer to their new
employers were suggested by work performed at their old jobs and that
the former employer actually owned the development at issue.
In this respect, the court's enforcement of Brown's invention disclosure agreement sets forth a disturbing precedent. Unlike covenants not
to compete, which are carefully scrutinized to ensure that they are reasonable in scope and duration, 10 7 invention disclosure agreements are
103. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 186(2).
104. Evan Brown, Does Your Employer Own Your Thoughts? <http://www.unixguru.
corn> (last updated Sep. 23, 2002).
105. Goldman, supra n. 3.
106. S.J. Hrg. Tr. 27:1-17.
107. In Texas, covenants not to compete are enforceable when ancillary to or part of an
otherwise enforceable agreement at the time the agreement is made to the extent that it
contains limitations as to time, geographical area, and scope of activity to be restrained
that are reasonable and do not impose a greater restraint than is necessary to protect the
goodwill or other business interest of the promisee. Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 15.50. Likewise, section 188 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides that a promise by an
employee or other agent not to compete with his employer or other principal is a restraint
ancillary to a valid transaction and enforceable only if the restraint is greater than is
needed to protect the promisee's legitimate interest, or the promisee's need is outweighed

314

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

[Vol. MX

subject to the ordinary principles of contract interpretation. By drafting
a sufficiently inclusive disclosure agreement and by making its acceptance a condition of employment, an employer could assert ownership
rights in any idea or thought an employee might have, regardless of
whether or not the employee was on company time or merely had a flash
of inspiration on his own.
On appeal, this case should be reversed and remanded for a trial on
the merits. When analyzing invention disclosure agreements, the court
should keep in mind the principle stated in § 186 of the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts,'0 s and find such agreements unenforceable when
they unreasonably restrain trade by allowing employers to lock up an
employee's thoughts with an overly inclusive disclosure agreement. 10 9
This does not mean that all invention disclosure agreements must be
unenforceable. On the contrary, it is clear that such agreements are an
important part of a technology-based economy and can be an effective
and reasonable way for companies to acquire and protect valuable inventions. 1 10 Invention disclosure agreements can be reasonably drafted and
interpreted to protect an employer's interest in acquiring ownership
rights to intellectual property developed by its employees while protecting employees' rights to their own thoughts and their right to benefit
by the hardship to the promisor and the likely injury to the public. Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 188.
108. Section 186 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides: (1) a promise is unenforceable on grounds of public policy if it is unreasonably in restraint of trade; and (2) a
promise is in restraint of trade if its performance would limit competition in any business
or restrict the promisor in the exercise of a gainful occupation. Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 186.
109. In this case, Brown's Invention Disclosure Agreement required him to disclose to
DSC all inventions, including but not limited to all matters subject to patent, made or
conceived from the time of entering the company's employ until his departure that were
along the lines of the business, work, or investigations of the company or resulting from or
are suggested by any work Brown might do for or on behalf of the company. Employee Pat.
Agreement of Evan Brown. Applying the rule in § 186 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts to this agreement, as interpreted to cover the Solution, a court might find that the
agreement was against public policy because it failed to distinguish between work done on
behalf of DSC and the natural products of Brown's independent learning. A more extreme
example of an invention disclosure agreement that would be unenforceable under § 186
would be a contract that required the employee to disclose to the company all inventions
conceived by the employee during his employ that involved any knowledge or skill gained
during the period of employment, regardless of how much such skill contributed to the
invention. An agreement such as this would be unenforceable under § 186 because an employer could sue an employee for breach of the contract if the employee attempted to use his
accumulated knowledge to create an invention either for himself or another employer that
was based in part on things he learned from his previous job, regardless of whether he used
that knowledge on behalf of his former employer or merely acquired it as an incident of his
employment.
110. Goldman, supra n. 3, at § Seeking Bright Lines.
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from flashes of independent inspiration."1 '
Courts reviewing invention disclosure agreements should look to
§ 188 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts for guidance on how to
interpret invention disclosure agreements. In other words, courts should
hold that an invention disclosure agreement that is ancillary to an otherwise valid agreement or relationship is unreasonably in restraint of
trade if: (1) the restraint is greater than needed to protect the employer's
right to assert ownership in inventions developed by employees within
the scope of their employment, or (2) the employer's interest is outweighed by the harm to the employee and the likely harm to the public.i i 2 Courts should find that invention disclosure agreements are
ancillary to a valid agreement if they are a prior condition of at-will employment or a part of an employment contract.
Under such an analysis, an invention disclosure agreement would be
enforceable if the employee understood that one would be required of
him when he accepts an employer's job offer in the same way that an
offer of employment is conditioned on taking and passing a drug test. An
invention disclosure agreement would also be enforceable if an employer
offers real consideration for the employee's consent. Under the Light
rule," i 3 the "promise" of continued at-will employment would not be sufficient, so an employer who sought to impose an invention disclosure
agreement on an employee would have to provide an additional benefit in
exchange for such a promise."i 4 Where a contract fails to specify the
111. An example of such an agreement might require the employee to disclose to the
company any inventions conceived while on compensated time (i.e. during a regular work
day or overtime). Thus, if Brown had developed the Solution on company time under such
an agreement, DSC would have a claim to it. Alternatively, an agreement might require
the employee to document research conducted at work and assert ownership rights in said
research. If Brown had developed and documented an idea for the Solution while at work,
DSC could have claimed ownership. A fair invention disclosure agreement would set
boundaries on the kinds of things a company could claim. While it is only fair for a company to benefit from the work an employee does while the company is paying him, a company should not be allowed to claim ownership of an invention that an employee develops
using, in part, general knowledge and skills gained as a natural result of his on-the-job
learning.
112. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 188.
113. Light, 883 S.W.2d at 644.
114. A company could make such an agreement ancillary to at-will employment if it
conditioned its offer of employment on the employee's acceptance of the agreement's terms
in the same way an employer might condition an offer of employment on the employee's
successful completion of a drug test. In such a case, employment, and the associated benefits, would be consideration for acceptance of the agreement. An employer who hired someone pursuant to an employment contract could make acceptance of an invention disclosure
agreement one of the conditions of the offer. For example, an employer who hired a contractor for a specific project might include an invention disclosure clause in the contract
that would require the contractor to disclose inventions conceived on the job. Finally, an
employer who had already hired an at-will employee could offer actual consideration in
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terms of disclosure, or does so in vague terms, the invention disclosure
agreement should be interpreted no more broadly than necessary to protect the employer's legitimate interest in owning its employees'
inventions.115
When determining the extent of an employer's legitimate interests
in its employees' inventions, courts should balance the employer's need
to acquire valuable intellectual property with the employee's right to independently develop his own ideas and to use them for his own benefit. 11 6 A good balance would be to give employers the right to own items
of intellectual property that: (1) employees have developed as a result of
instructions given to them by their supervisors and (2) substantially
1 17
achieve the desired results.
Under this analysis, if DSC had instructed Brown to develop an automated decompiler so that it could update its existing computer systems, and Brown's Solution had yielded a process that DSC's other
employees could follow in order to produce a working program, then the
Solution would fall under the invention disclosure agreement. If DSC
had instructed Brown to translate object code to source code so that
exchange for the employee's agreement to the disclosure contract. This might include additional monetary compensation or some other benefit to which the employee was not already
entitled by virtue of his position. For example, a company might offer an employee the use
of a company car or some other benefit that the employee did not already enjoy and would
not enjoy but for his acceptance of the agreement.
115. Section 188 cmt. g of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides some guidance
by analogy to covenants not to compete as agreements in restraint of trade ancillary to a
legitimate agreement. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 188 cmt. g. It provides that:
Post-employment restraints are scrutinized with particular care because they are
often the product of unequal bargaining power and because the employee is likely
to give scant attention to the hardship he may later suffer through loss of his livelihood. This is especially so where the restraint is imposed by the employer's standardized printed form. A line must be drawn between the general skills and
knowledge of the trade and information that is peculiar to the employer's business.
If the employer seeks to justify the restraint on the ground of the employee's
knowledge of a process or method, the confidentiality of that process or method
and its technological life may be critical. The public interest in workable employer-employee relationships with an efficient use of employees must be balanced
against the interest in individual economic freedom.
Id. Under this kind of analysis, courts should distinguish between inventions conceived as
a result of the employee's duties to the company and inventions building upon general
skills of the trade the employee has gained as a result of his work.
116. Id.
117, By way of example, a court might analyze the instant case as follows: first, the
court would determine whether or not DSC had instructed Brown to develop a tool for
converting object code into source code. Second, the court would determine whether the
tool developed substantially achieved the company's stated goal. This type of approach
would ensure that companies would be able to own and benefit from those inventions their
employees developed on behalf of their employers. At the same time, it would reserve to
the employees the right to pursue their own ideas on their own time and to speculate as to
theoretical improvements to existing tools or methods.
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software could be converted to run on another computer system and
Brown had developed a tool that enabled him to do so, then that tool
would likewise fall within the scope of the invention disclosure
agreement.
But DSC should not be allowed to own the result of Brown's learning
process. Brown had developed his theory of automated decompilation
before he went to work for DSC. While he worked on other projects,
some involving manual program conversion and others involving the conversion of code between versions of the same language, 118 Brown gained
the knowledge necessary to complete his theory for automated decompilation of any object code. DSC did not ask Brown to develop the Solution
for its own use. DSC did not pay Brown to apply knowledge gained on
the job to a problem that had vexed him since college. 1 19 Brown did not
produce a working Solution to the problem.1 20 DSC should have no right
to claim ownership in a mere idea that Brown developed outside the
scope of what DSC paid him for.
VI.

CONCLUSION

When the 219th Judicial District Court of the State of Texas decided
that Alcatel owned Evan Brown's thoughts, it did not take into account
the genuine issues of material fact that existed with respect to Brown's
assertions: (1) the invention disclosure agreement it secured from Brown
on threat of immediate termination was unenforceable, (2) the Solution
was not an "invention" as recognized by U.S. intellectual property law
either when DSC fired Brown and sued him or in its current state of
disclosure, and (3) the development of an automatic decompiler was not
within the scope of DSC's business or suggested by Brown's work for the
company.
In addition, the court failed to recognize the effect that its decision
could have if followed by other courts. When a company hires an employee, it pays him to act as its agent for a limited number of hours each
day. While it is reasonable for an employer to require its employees to
disclose to it any inventions they might develop while working at their
jobs, no employer should be able to claim a total ownership interest in
the thoughts of its employees, especially when those thoughts were
based in substantial part on an employee's prior knowledge and when
the discovery at issue came as a flash of inspiration far removed from the
workplace.
118. S.J. Hrg. Tr. 38:2-11.
119. Aff. Brown [ 3 (Dec. 1, 1998). While DSC hired Brown because of his skills, the
tasks that DSC gave him did not, according to Brown's affidavit, deal with the problem that
he had worked on for years prior to his employment with the company.
120. S.J. Hrg. Tr. 24:16-17.
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Invention disclosure agreements are admittedly very important for
corporations in the modern technological economy. The right to own and
exploit the products of their employees' labor is critical. However, that
right must be limited. An employer should own things that employees
develop on company time under company supervision, which help solve
problems for the company. On the other hand, no employer has an unlimited right to reap the benefits of an employee's learning process.
Human beings learn and grow with experience. They need the right to
use that experience for their own benefit. No employer should have the
right to force an employee to surrender a potentially valuable idea substantially developed on the employee's own time as part of the employee's personal quest for knowledge simply because knowledge gained
on the job indirectly contributed to the employee's intellectual growth.
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DOES YOUR BOSS OWN YOUR BRAIN?

In the 219th Judicial DistrictCourt
of the State of Texas
Curt B.Henderson, Judge Presiding
No. 199-001596-97

ALCATEL USA, INC. flk/a DSC COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION
VS.

EVAN BROWN
FINAL JUDGMENT

On October 10, 2001, Plaintiff filed its Motion for Summary Judgment on
its Breach of Contract and Declaratory Judgment Claims (Plaintiff's Summary
Judgment Motion). On December 21, 2001, the Court held a hearing on Plaintiff's
Summary Judgment Motion, as well as other discovery matters.

Proper and

sufficient notice of this heanin'g was given to all parties of record, and both
parties were present and announced ready to proceed.

After hearing oral

argument from both parties at the December 21, 2002 hearing, and in the interest
of justice, the Court withheld ruling on Plaintiff's Summary Judgment Motion,
and granted Defendant additional time to file addition responses, including
additional evidence, in opposition to Plaintiff's Summary Judgment Motion. In
accordance with this directive, Defendant filed his Amended Response to
Plaintiff's First Motion on February 20, 2002, and each party filed additional
briefing as well. In addition, at the December 21, 2001 hearing the Court also
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issued certain discovery directives to Plaintiff related to Defendant's Motion to
Compel and Motion for Continuance, and Plaintiff fully complied with those
directives and produced additional information responsive to Defendant's
discovery requests, some of which was included in Defendant's February 20,
2002 Amended Response.
After carefully
Defendant's

written

considering
Response,

Plaintiff's Summary Judgment
Defendant's

Amended

Motion,

Response,

all

supplemental briefing, and the arguments of counsel, the Court concluded that
the Plaintiff's Summary Judgment Motion had merit and should be granted.
Accordingly, by order dated May 16, 2002, the Court:
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment on its Breach of Contract and Declaratory Judgment claims
should be and was GRANTED. Specifically, the Court found and concluded
that:
1.

Plaintiff is entitled to judgment on its breach of contract claim;

2.

Plaintiff is entitled to judgment on its Declaratory Judgment claim.
Specifically, the Court enters the following declarations:
a.

The April 27, 1987 Employee Patent, Copyright and
Proprietary Information Agreement between Evan Brown
and DSC Communications Corp. n/k/a Alcatel USA, Inc.
(the "Employment Agreement") is a valid and enforceable
contract;

b.

Pursuant
to
the
Employment
Agreement,
DSC
Communications Corp. n/k/a Alcatel USA, Inc. ("Alcatel")
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owns full legal right, title and interest to the process and/or
ncthod developed by Evan Brown for 1) converting
machine executable binary code into a high level source code
using logic and data abstractions, 2) taking existing
executable
programs and
reverse engineering
the
intelligence from those programs and re-coding the
intelligence into portable high level language, and 3)
converting executable Z8000 machine code into C language
source (all collectively describing what shall hereinafter be
referred tc as the "Solution");

3.

c.

Pursuant to the Employment Agreement, Evan Brown is
obligated to fully disclose the Solution to Alcatel;

d.

Evan Brown cannot disclose, sell, assign or transfer the
Solution to an'one other than Alcatel;

e.

Evan Brown cannot negotiate the disclosure, sale,
assignment or transfer of the Solution to anyone other than
Alcatel; and

t.

Even Brown cannot further develop or market the Solution
to anyone other than Alcatel.

Pursuant to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code §37.001 and
§38.001 et. seq., Plaintiff is entitled to recover its attorneys fees.

4.

Plaintiff's Objections to Defendant's Evidence in Opposition to
Plaintiff's Fir .t Moticon, filed December 21, 2001, are sustained with
respect to Exhibits 4 and 5.

5.

Piaintiff's Objection to a hearing on Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment is sustained as a consequence of sanction
imposed earlier in this litigation.'

I

Fhe Cout observes that the same arguments contained in Defendant's Motion

for Summary Judgment were also argued in opposition to 'laintiff's First Motion. As such, the
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On June 3, 2002, consistent with the instructions set forth by the Court in
its May 16, 2002 Order, Plaintiff filed its Motion for Summary Judgment on
Defendant's Counterclaims ("Plaintiff's Counterclaim Motion") and Motion for
Summary Judgment for its Attorneys' Fees ("Plaintiff's Attorneys' Fees Motion").
These two motions for summary judgment were properly scheduled for hearing
before the Court on June 28, 2002.
Shortly before the scheduled June 28, 2002 hearing, Defendant filed a
Motion to Recuse. The Court declined to recuse itself, and properly forwarded
Defendant's Motion to recuse, as well as Plaintiff's Response, to the presiding
judge of the administrative judicial district in accordance with the Texas rules of
Civil Procedure, and the presiding judge of the administrative judicial district
thereafter assigned that motion to Judge Marvin Marshall for determination.
Judge Marshall, after hearing the arguments of counsel and the evidence
introduced at that hearing. DENIFD Defendant's Motion to Recuse at 12:14 p.m.
on June 28, 2002.
Following Judge Marshal's denial of Defendant's Motion to Recuse, the
Court conducted a hearing on Plaintiff's Counterclaim Motion and Plaintiff's
Attorneys' Fee:. Mction. The Court finds and concludes that it was authorized to
conduct the June 28. 2)02 heariig on Plaintiff's two motions for summary
judgment given Jud.ge Ma-shal's prior denial of the Motion to Recuse. The Court

Court's entry of iLs Ordt !- granting Plaintiff's First Motion is effectively a denial of Defendant's

Motion.
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further finds and concludes that proper and sufficient notice of this June 28, 2002
hearing was g-ven to all parties of record.

Both parties were present at the

hearing and announced ready to proceed on the two Motions.
After considering the Plaintiff's two Motions, Defendant's Response, and
the arguments of counsel, the Court is of the opinion that the two Motions have
merit and should both be GRANTED. Accordingly, by Memorandum entered on
June 28, 2002, the Court:
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment on Defendant's Counterclaims shall be and hereby is
GRANTED. Defendant's Counterclaims shall be and hereby are dismissed with
prejudice. It is further,
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiff's objections to
Exhibits 3, 17, 18 and 22 of Defendant's Counterclaims shall be and hereby are
sustained as follows:
i. Exhibit 3 - Plaintiff's attorney-client privilege and Rule 408
objection are sustained except as to the heading (addressees)
ant first full paragraph;
ii. Exhibit 17 - Plaintiff's hearsay objection sustained;
iii. Exhibit 18 - Plaintiff's relevance objection is sustained; and
iv. Exhibit 22 - Plaintiff's relevance and hearsay objections are
sustaied.
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It is further,
ORDERED, ADJUDGED

AND DECREED that Plaintiff's Motion for

summary Judgment for its Attorneys' Fees shall be and hereby is GRANTED.
Plaintiff Alcatel USA, Inc. f/k/a DSC Communications Corp. is awarded
reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees in the amount of $332,000. It is further,
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiff Alcatel USA, Inc.
f k/a DSC Communications Corp. shall be entitled to interest on the above
award of attorneys' fees in the amount of 10% per annum until such fees are
recovered in full. It i,; further,
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that all court costs are taxed
against Defend!ant Evan Brown.

P!aintiff is allowed all writs and processes as

may be necessary for the enforcement and collection of the costs of court.
All other relief in this case not expressly granted herein is DENIED.
SIGNED this -,2.6_ day of July, 2002.

Curt B. Henderson
I udge Presiding

Final Judgment
219th Judicial District Court

Page 6 of 6
Curt B. Henderson, Judge Presiding

